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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal originates from a decision by the Zoning 
Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, New 
Jersey denying an application by three cellular 
communication providers for variances necessary to build a 
wireless communications facility within the Borough. The 
providers claim that the Borough's decision violates section 
704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because: 1) the 
Zoning Board unlawfully considered the quality of existing 
wireless service during the decision process; 2) its decision 
is not supported by substantial evidence; and 3) the 
decision has the effect of prohibiting personal wireless 
services. The providers also claim that the Zoning Board's 
decision violates New Jersey state zoning law. The District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Zoning 
Board on all issues. We will affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
The parties have stipulated to the following facts, taken 
largely from the District Court's opinion. See Cellular Tel. 
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Co. v. Zoning Board, 24 F. Supp. 2d 359 (D. N.J. 1998). 
Two of the providers, Cellular Telephone Company, d/b/a 
AT&T Wireless Services, and Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Bell 
Atlantic Nynex Mobile, are licensed by the Federal 
Communications Commission to provide wireless cellular 
telephone service to the Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, New 
Jersey. SMART SMR of New York, Inc., d/b/a Nextel 
Communications, is licensed to provide wireless mobile 
radio services. On August 2, 1994, AT&T and the Borough 
entered into a lease for 2,350 square feet of Borough-owned 
property on which AT&T planned to construct a wireless 
telecommunications facility. The facility, as contemplated 
by the lease, would include a wireless communications 
monopole, associated antennae, and related equipment 
shelters, all of which would be surrounded by a security 
fence. Thereafter, Bell Atlantic and Nextel entered into co- 
location agreements with the Borough, authorized by the 
AT&T lease, allowing Bell Atlantic and Nextel to install their 
own antennae on the proposed monopole, and to utilize a 
portion of the accompanying equipment shelters. AT&T, 
Bell Atlantic and Nextel are referred to collectively 
throughout this opinion as the "providers." 
 
The AT&T lease was contingent upon the company 
acquiring all required zoning variances, special use permits 
and building permits. Although the proposed site is located 
in an R-2 residential zone, it is actually part of two larger 
lots (Lots 3 and 4 in Block 603 of the Borough of Ho-Ho- 
Kus), which contain, among other things, the Department 
of Public Works' salt storage barn and accompanying 
fencing, a motor vehicle fueling area, a public recycling 
center, and open storage for municipal equipment. The lots 
do not contain any residences. Two sides of the leased site 
border public roads, while a third abuts the New Jersey 
Transit railroad line. 
 
On September 3, 1994, the providers applied to the 
Borough's zoning official for variances necessary to 
construct three buildings, a 125-foot monopole with 
antennae reaching as high as 127 feet, and a six-foot high 
barbed wire fence. The proposed monopole would be a 
cylindrical galvanized steel structure measuring three feet 
in diameter at its base and eighteen inches at its top. The 
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monopole would support twenty seven antennae, nine for 
each of the providers, in a 360o array. Maintenance 
personnel would visit the site approximately once a month, 
but it would be otherwise unmanned. The zoning official 
denied the application. The providers then amended their 
application, reducing the number of equipment shelters 
from three to two, changing the layout of all planned 
improvements on the site, and lowering the security fence 
from six to five feet. The zoning official denied the amended 
application as well. 
 
The providers next brought both their original and 
amended applications before the Zoning Board of 
Adjustment, seeking thirteen variances from the Borough's 
zoning ordinance. On April 24, 1997, after two and a half 
years and forty-four public hearings, the Board voted to 
deny the applications. The Board then memorialized its 
decision in a thirty-six page resolution adopted on June 5, 
1997 (the "Resolution"). The Resolution concluded as 
follows: 
 
       [T]he public interest which will be served by the 
       proposed monopole is not substantial, as the quality of 
       cellular telephone service already being provided within 
       the Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus is adequate . . . . The Board 
       [also] finds that the site is inappropriate for that use, 
       given its already congested nature, and [the fact that] 
       numerous bulk variances are required, including one 
       related to the required setback of the structure from 
       the property lines. The Board also finds that the 
       construction of the monopole will have a substantially 
       detrimental impact upon the public good and the 
       purpose and intent of the zone plan and ordinance 
       based upon a significant detrimental visual impact, the 
       construction of such a massive structure on a 
       relatively tiny piece of property, and a significant 
       decline in real property values. The Board finds that 
       . . . the balance must be struck in favor of denying the 
       application. The public good being served is not 
       compelling. Due to the nature of the structure, no 
       conditions can be imposed that would reduce the 
       impact, and on balance the negative considerations 
       outweigh the benefits to be obtained. 
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Resolution: Zoning Board of Adjustment, Borough of Ho- 
Ho-Kus, June 5, 1997 at 35-36, reprinted in Brief for 
Appellant app. at A177-78. 
 833<!>On judicial review, the district court granted the 
 
Borough's motion for summary judgment, finding that the 
Board's denial did not have the effect of prohibiting 
personal wireless services, was supported by substantial 
evidence, and was based on a proper application of state 
zoning laws. The providers appealed. We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. See Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 867 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
II. Discussion 
 
The providers first claim that the Board's decision has 
the effect of prohibiting personal wireless services in Ho-Ho- 
Kus, and thus violates S 704 of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, codified at 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7). As part of this 
claim, the providers argue that the Board had no authority 
to consider the quality of existing personal wireless service 
when ruling on their applications. In the alternative, they 
argue that the Ho-Ho-Kus zoning ordinance, though facially 
neutral, effectively prohibits personal wireless services in 
violation of the Telecommunications Act. The providers also 
claim that the Board's denial violates the 
Telecommunications Act because it is not supported by 
substantial evidence. Finally, the providers claim that the 
Board's denial is invalid because it relies on a 
misapplication of applicable state zoning laws. 
 
A. Local Zoning Authority 
 
The Telecommunications Act expressly preserves local 
zoning authority over the placement, construction and 
modification of personal wireless service facilities. See 47 
U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(A). Nevertheless, the statute subjects the 
exercise of local zoning authority1 to six limitations. First, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The statute actually preserves the zoning authority of the states, 
local 
governments and instrumentalities thereof. We refer exclusively to "local" 
zoning authority for simplicity's sake only. 
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local regulation may not unreasonably discriminate among 
providers of functionally equivalent wireless services. See 
id. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I). Second, local regulation may not 
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of 
personal wireless services. See id. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). Third, 
local regulators must act on placement, construction and 
modification applications within a reasonable period of 
time. See id. S 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). Fourth, all decisions denying 
a request to place, construct or modify a personal wireless 
services facility must be in writing and supported by 
substantial evidence contained in a written record. See id. 
S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Fifth, any person adversely affected by 
local regulators' final action on a placement, construction, 
or modification application may seek judicial review in any 
court of competent jurisdiction. See id. S 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 
Finally, the statute substantially limits the authority of 
local officials to regulate personal wireless facilities on the 
basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency 
emissions. See id. S 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). 
 
In the course of its long deliberations over the 
applications at issue, the Board received testimony and 
other evidence from both the providers and their opponents 
concerning the quality of existing personal wireless services 
in Ho-Ho-Kus. A radio frequency engineer for AT&T testified 
that there were various areas within the Borough where the 
quality of service was very poor, and other areas where the 
odds of actually being able to place or receive a call were so 
low as to render them essentially "no service" areas. See 
Transcript: March 9, 1995 Ho-Ho-Kus Board of Adjustment 
Hearing at 124-26, reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at 
A438-40. Similarly, a radio frequency engineer for Bell 
Atlantic testified that his company's cellular service in the 
area was marginal at best, and generally unreliable. See 
Transcript: April 13, 1995 Ho-Ho-Kus Board of Adjustment 
Hearing at 109-11, reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at 
A741-43. A Nextel engineer described his company's mobile 
radio service in the Borough as "almost non-existent." See 
id. at 169, reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at A801. 
 
In response, two Ho-Ho-Kus residents presented tape 
recordings they had made of twelve cellular telephone calls 
placed from various locations within the Borough. The 
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recordings apparently demonstrated relatively good 
connection and transmission quality with respect to the 
twelve calls recorded, and the Board accepted them as 
competent evidence that existing wireless service as a whole 
was adequate. See Resolution: Zoning Board of Adjustment, 
Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, June 5, 1997 at 13, reprinted in 
Appellant's Brief app. at A153; see also, Transcript: May 
23, 1996 Ho-Ho-Kus Board of Adjustment Hearing at 59- 
89, reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at A1907-37. 
 
The providers challenged the evidentiary value of the tape 
recordings and pointed out that while the residents placed 
twelve calls, AT&T's tests included calls from approximately 
2,500 locations within the borough. Because AT&T 
conducted five such tests, the total data apparently 
included at least 12,500 calls. Underscoring further this 
dramatic difference in the sample size, the providers point 
out that of the residents' twelve calls, only two calls were 
placed from the worst service areas. The residents also 
made the calls in April when few trees had foliage, a 
significant source of interference; they called while 
stationary, again avoiding sources of interference; and all of 
their calls were made on a Saturday when demand was low, 
yet another variable affecting call performance. Finally, the 
residents only recorded the uplink, which is picked up by 
the more sensitive receiver at a cellular facility and 
transmitted to a land-line phone. They did not record the 
more problematic downlink that a cellular phone receives 
from its much less sensitive antenna. Evidence produced 
from the providers' own test calls indicated that most 
suffered from some form of technical difficulty. 
 
After weighing the conflicting evidence, the Board 
concluded that the quality of existing cellular service within 
the Borough and surrounding area was sufficient, and that 
there was therefore no legitimate need for the proposed 
monopole. See Resolution of the Zoning Board of 
Adjustment, Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, June 27, 1997 at 25, 
reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at A165. The providers 
argue, however, that local authorities are barred from 
considering quality of service issues when determining 
whether and where to permit wireless communication 
facilities within their jurisdictions. They contend that the 
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comprehensive body of federal law regulating the 
telecommunications industry effectively, if not expressly, 
preempts local authorities from regulating the quality of 
personal wireless services. They further contend that 
because judging the quality of wireless services does not 
concern the physical location and construction of cellular 
facilities, it is not a legitimate exercise of zoning power, but 
rather an unlawful intrusion upon the Federal 
Communications Commission's exclusive regulatory 
authority. 
 
As an initial matter, we reject the proposition that local 
zoning authorities are wholly barred from considering the 
quality of existing personal wireless service. Obviously, local 
officials must, at a minimum, consider whether wireless 
service currently exists within their jurisdictions if they are 
to determine whether rejecting a proposed wireless 
communications facility would have the effect of prohibiting 
such service. The providers contend, however, that allowing 
local officials to go beyond this threshold consideration, 
and to reject wireless communication facilities based on 
their own evaluation of existing service, would undermine 
the Telecommunications Act's twin goals of encouraging 
rapid deployment of new technologies and providing 
nationwide seamless cellular service to the public. 
 
Contrary to the providers' arguments, we conclude that 
barring all local quality-of-service considerations could just 
as easily undermine the Telecommunications Act's goals as 
further them. Decisions to grant or deny variances from 
local zoning ordinances generally require local officials to 
balance the interests that will be affected by the decision. 
Indeed, New Jersey law specifically mandates such a 
balancing approach. Obviously, one of the interests affected 
by a decision to grant or deny a variance necessary to 
construct a wireless communications facility is the quality 
of existing wireless services. A finding that existing service 
is relatively poor could tip the scale in favor of granting a 
variance that, absent consideration of current quality, 
might otherwise be denied. 
 
In so holding, we do not suggest that the discretion of 
local officials is unlimited. The Telecommunications Act 
imposes a number of explicit restrictions on the exercise of 
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local zoning authority. For instance, determinations 
concerning the quality of existing service must be based on 
substantial, competent evidence and remain subject to 
judicial review. Additionally, although the 
Telecommunications Act does not divest local officials of 
any authority they may have to consider the quality of 
existing wireless services, neither does it create such 
authority. Efforts to assess existing quality, and to weigh 
the benefits of enhancing it against the possible costs, must 
be authorized by and performed within the parameters of 
governing state and local law. 
 
Finally, as the Telecommunications Act itself dictates, 
local officials must always ensure that neither their general 
policies nor their individual decisions prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting personal wireless services. We interpret 
this mandate to mean more than simply ensuring that 
personal wireless services are available somewhere within 
the relevant jurisdiction, even if they are not available 
throughout. Thus, we conclude, as did the court in Sprint 
Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999), 
that local zoning policies and decisions have the effect of 
prohibiting wireless communication services if they result 
in "significant gaps" in the availability of wireless services. 
Building on the Willoth court's analysis, we conclude that 
there is a "gap" in personal wireless services when a remote 
user of those services is unable either to connect with the 
land-based national telephone network, or to maintain a 
connection capable of supporting a reasonably 
uninterrupted communication. See id. at 641-43. We do not 
attempt here to define what constitutes a "significant" gap 
in local wireless services.2 Rather, we will leave it for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There may be any number of factors that a reviewing court may find 
it necessary to consider when determining whether a significant gap 
exists, and we make no attempt to enumerate them here. We think it 
matters a great deal, however, whether the "gap" in service merely covers 
a small residential cul-de-sac or whether it straddles a significant 
commuter highway or commuter railway. Unlike a utility such as 
electrical power, cellular service is used in transit, so a gap that 
covers 
a well-traveled road could affect large numbers of travelers--and the 
people who are trying to communicate with them. Over the course of a 
year, the total disruption caused could be quite significant. Here the 
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district court to determine, if necessary, whether there is a 
significant gap in service and, if so, whether there are any 
less intrusive means for closing that gap. 
 
B. The Effect of the Ho-Ho-Kus Zoning Ordinance 
 
As previously noted, construction of the proposed 
wireless communications facility at the center of this case 
would require thirteen variances from the Zoning Ordinance 
of the Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus. The Ordinance, for example, 
limits the height of radio and television antennae to 50 feet, 
while the proposed monopole and antennae would be 127 
feet high. The Ordinance also includes a "fall down zone" 
provision that requires the distance between the monopole 
and all adjacent property lines to be at least as far as the 
monopole is high. The proposed monopole, however, would 
stand just 4.25 feet from one adjoining property line and 
26.42 feet from another. 
 
The providers argue that because wireless 
communication antennae must be located above the tree 
line, a 50-foot height restriction in a locality such as Ho- 
Ho-Kus, where the prevailing tree line is 70 feet, amounts 
to an effective ban on wireless facilities. Similarly, they 
argue that because the fall-down provision limits their 
proposed facility to sites containing a minimum of 
1-1/2 acres in a town where there is virtually no open 
space, it too has a prohibitory effect. These arguments 
fail to address the central issue, however. The 
Telecommunications Act bars local regulation that prohibits 
or has the effect of prohibiting personal wireless services, 
not the facilities that provide those services. Under the right 
conditions, it may be possible to provide an adequate level 
of personal wireless services to a particular community 
solely through facilities located outside that community. We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
proposed tower will be installed next to a railway and several roads that 
the cellular companies described as significant commuter routes. 
According to the cellular companies' data, signal strength on Route 17, 
as it passed through Ho-Ho-Kus, fell well below what the companies say 
is acceptable service. We suggest the district court consider such factors 
in determining what constitutes a significant gap in service. 
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are not prepared to hold that every community must permit 
wireless communication facilities somewhere within its 
borders regardless of the need for such facilities, nor do the 
facts of this case require us to decide the issue now. 
 
The issue here is whether the Board's rejection of the 
proposed wireless communication facilities has the effect of 
prohibiting personal wireless services. The providers 
acknowledge that some level of personal wireless service 
currently exists in Ho-Ho-Kus, although the level of service 
provided by each ranges from spotty to unreliable to non- 
existent. For its part, the Board has assessed the quality of 
existing service and determined that the improvements 
offered by the proposed facility are outweighed by its 
negative impact on the community. In assessing overall 
quality, however, the Board never specifically determined 
whether there are significant gaps in the current service. 
Consequently, we will reverse the district court's summary 
judgment on the issue of prohibitory effect. 
 
While we have held that local officials are not barred from 
considering the quality of existing wireless service and, in 
the first instance at least, whether there are any significant 
gaps in that service, we note that their findings on this 
issue are not reviewed under the substantial evidence 
standard. That standard applies only to decisions denying 
requests for authorization to place, construct or modify 
personal wireless facilities. In contrast, the statutory bar 
against regulatory prohibition is absolute, and does not 
anticipate any deference to local findings. See 47 U.S.C.A. 
S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). Because we believe the communication 
providers have presented evidence that there may be 
significant gaps that only the proposed facility can close, we 
will reverse summary judgment on the issue of prohibitory 
effect. 
 
C. The Substantial Evidence Challenge 
 
The Telecommunications Act requires that any decision 
denying a request to place, construct, or modify personal 
wireless service facilities be in writing and supported by 
substantial evidence contained in a written record. See 47 
U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Substantial evidence "does not 
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mean a large or considerable amount of evidence,`but 
rather such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.' " Pierce v. Underwood, 
487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (1988) (quoting 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. 
Ct. 206, 217 (1938)); see also Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning 
Hearing Bd, 181 F.3d 403, 408 (3d Cir. 1999). A reviewing 
court's task is to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence in the record as a whole to support the challenged 
decision. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 
474, 491, 71 S. Ct. 56 (1951). It has no power either to 
weigh the evidence contained in that record or to substitute 
its own conclusions for those of the fact-finder. See 
Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. Nevertheless, if the record as a 
whole contains conflicting evidence, the fact-finder must 
adequately explain its reasons for rejecting or discrediting 
competent evidence. See Benton v. Bowen, 820 F.2d 85, 88 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
 
In the context of S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), the decision process 
itself is governed by applicable state and local zoning laws. 
The reviewing court's task is to determine whether the 
decision, as guided by local law, is supported by 
substantial evidence. See Omnipoint Corp., 181 F.3d at 408. 
Under New Jersey law, local zoning officials must weigh the 
positive and negative factors associated with a requested 
zoning variance and determine whether, on balance, those 
factors weigh in favor of granting or rejecting the request. 
Thus, the reviewing court's task is to determine whether 
the findings of local officials concerning the positive and 
negative factors, and their relative weight, is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
 
The providers do not claim that the record, as a whole, 
lacks substantial evidence to support the Board's decision. 
Rather, they challenge two of the Board's specificfindings 
as being unsupported by substantial evidence. First, they 
challenge the Board's finding that existing personal wireless 
service is adequate, arguing that it is based on incompetent 
evidence. Second, the providers challenge the Board's 
finding that the proposed monopole would have a 
substantial detrimental impact on the value of surrounding 
properties. Again, they argue that the Board's detrimental 
impact finding relies on incompetent evidence. 
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During the public hearings held to consider the proposed 
wireless communications facility, the Board heard from 
three experts who testified about the proposed monopole's 
economic impact on surrounding properties. The providers 
presented two experts who testified that the monopole 
would have no detrimental economic impact, while their 
opponents presented one expert who testified to the 
contrary. The providers' experts relied, at least in part, on 
their conclusions that the very visible presence of 
telecommunications towers in other New Jersey 
communities had had no discernable effect on the value of 
nearby upscale homes. These experts reasoned that if the 
visibility of communications towers had no effect on the 
"high-end" homes they had studied, it would not adversely 
effect the value of the more moderately priced homes found 
in Ho-Ho-Kus. The opponent's expert disagreed. Relying on 
a "paired-sales" analysis (i.e., comparing the sale price of a 
home from which a communications tower was visible to 
the sale price of a similar home from which no tower was 
visible) he presented evidence tending to show that the 
proposed monopole would, in fact, adversely impact the 
value of some Ho-Ho-Kus homes. 
 
After hearing all the evidence, the Board chose to give 
greater credence to the opponents' expert than to the 
providers' experts. The Board explained that it favored the 
opponents' expert in part because the communities studied 
by the providers' experts were not sufficiently similar to Ho- 
Ho-Kus, and in part because the opponents' expert's 
paired-sales methodology was superior to the logical 
extrapolation on which the other experts had relied. 
 
On appeal, the providers challenge the scientific validity 
of the opposing expert's study. They argue that it included 
too few samples and too many subjective adjustments for 
factors other than the visibility of nearby communication 
towers that may have explained differences in sales price. 
They also note that the paired sales considered by the 
opponents' expert occurred in one of the very same towns 
the providers' expert had studied. When evaluating the 
providers' evidence, the Board concluded that 
dissimilarities between the studied town and Ho-Ho-Kus 
rendered the evidence unreliable. Yet, in concluding that 
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the opposing evidence was more reliable, the Board did not 
address the issue of community dissimilarities at all. The 
providers argue that the Board cannot have it both ways, 
and that if the claimed dissimilarities render their evidence 
unreliable, they must render the opposing evidence 
unreliable as well. 
 
While acknowledging the theoretical possibility that 
dissimilarities between two towns could render a 
comparative study based on one methodology less reliable 
than a study based on another, wholly different 
methodology, we are not certain how that would be true in 
this case. In any event, the Board did not discount the 
providers' evidence solely on the basis of dissimilarities 
between the relevant towns, but also because it found that 
the opposing evidence was based on a more reliable 
methodology. The only issue is whether it was reasonable 
for the Board to do so. We conclude that it was. Moreover, 
our decision does not turn on any single factor that the 
Board may have found weighed against approving the 
proposed facility. The Board considered a number of other 
factors, including the proposed facility's purely aesthetic 
impact on surrounding properties and the adverse effects 
approval would have on the purpose and intent of the 
Borough's zone plan and ordinance. The district court 
ruled, and we agree, that the Board's findings with respect 
to these other negative factors were supported by 
substantial evidence. 
 
The providers also claim that there is no substantial 
evidence to support the Board's finding that existing 
personal wireless service in the Borough is adequate. As 
discussed in part II-A of this opinion, supra, the providers 
presented the testimony of three separate experts 
concerning the various inadequacies of their respective 
services. Two local residents opposed to the proposed 
facility presented tape recordings of twelve cellular 
telephone calls they made from various locations within the 
Borough. The opponents claimed, and the Board agreed, 
that the tape recordings demonstrated a level of existing 
service "sufficient to properly serve the public good." See 
Resolution at 25, reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at 
A165. In reaching that conclusion, the Board also relied on 
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the providers' admission that there were no "no-service" 
areas3 within the Borough, and only three areas where the 
chances of getting a "no-service light"4 were very high. 
 
The district court found, as do we, that the tape 
recordings made by non-expert local opponents of the 
proposed facility were too insubstantial to discredit the 
expert testimony presented by the providers. Nevertheless, 
the district court upheld the Board's decision,finding that 
the "plaintiffs' own expert witnesses testified--at best -- 
only that there were some gaps in service within the 
Borough, not that service is unavailable." Cellular 
Telephone Company v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 24 F. 
Supp. 2d 359, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Holding as we do that 
the district court must determine whether those service 
gaps are significant, we cannot agree that the expert 
testimony in this record supports a finding that existing 
wireless service within the Borough is adequate. 
 
Moreover, our own review of the record indicates that the 
Board either misunderstood or mischaracterized the expert 
testimony on the issue of existing service. During the public 
hearings, the providers' experts rated the quality of existing 
wireless services in the Borough using an industry 
standard scale ranging from one to five. They testified that 
a five represents land-line quality service, meaning 
participants in a cellular telephone call will not hear any 
background static. At level four, there may be some static, 
but the conversation is basically unimpeded. At level three, 
static is constant and can impede conversation to the point 
of making individual words unintelligible. At level two, 
whole sentences are lost and intelligible conversation 
requires constant repetition and clarification. At level one, 
service is essentially non-existent because even though a 
connection may be made, any conversation would be 
unintelligible. See Transcript: April 13, 1996 Ho-Ho-Kus 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. A "no-service" area is an area in which it is not possible to establish 
a cellular connection at any time, under any circumstances. 
 
4. In contrast to a "no-service" area, a "no-service light" on a cellular 
telephone simply informs the user that she cannot establish a 
connection at that particular time, under the then existing calling 
conditions. 
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Board of Adjustment Hearing at 114-115, reprinted in 
Appellant's Brief app. at A750-51. 
 
Though the voluminous record produced during the 
Borough's 44 public hearings is somewhat difficult to 
parse, the providers' experts appear to have rated existing 
wireless service in Ho-Ho-Kus at level three for installed 
mobile phones (i.e., car phones), and somewhere between 
levels one and two for hand-held portable phones. See id. 
at 116, reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at A749. Thus, it 
may be factually correct that there are no "no-service" areas 
and only three areas in which cellular service users face a 
high likelihood of getting a "no-service" light. But there is 
also substantial, unrefuted evidence in the record that even 
if a cellular caller is able to make a connection from certain 
locations, any subsequent attempt at conversation will be 
difficult at best, and virtually impossible for users of the 
hand-held portable phones that dominate the market today. 
Thus, based on this record, we conclude that there is no 
substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that 
the current level of personal wireless service in Ho-Ho-Kus 
is adequate. 
 
While the Board considered several factors that weighed 
against approval, the only factor it considered with the 
potential to weigh in favor of approving the proposed facility 
was the adequacy of existing service. In other words, absent 
a finding that existing service was inadequate, or that the 
public would benefit by enhancing that service, any 
negative factor, no matter how slight, would have tipped the 
balance in favor of rejection. Because the Board'sfinding 
that existing service is adequate is not supported by 
substantial evidence, we will reverse the district court's 
summary judgment on this issue. 
 
D. State Zoning Law 
 
In New Jersey, the power of zoning boards of adjustment 
to grant variances is prescribed by state statute. See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. S 40:55D-70 (West Supp. 1999). Under that 
statute, a board's power to grant certain variances, 
including a conditional-use variance, from the local zoning 
ordinance is subject to certain limitations. Two are relevant 
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here. First, there must be "special reasons" for granting the 
variance. Id. S 40:55D-70(d). Second, the local board may 
not grant a variance without a showing that it "can be 
granted without substantial detriment to the public good 
and will not substantially impair the intent and the 
purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance." Id. New 
Jersey's courts refer to these limitations as creating 
"positive" and "negative" criteria that must be satisfied 
before a variance can be granted. See Sica v. Board of 
Adjustment, 127 N.J. 152, 156, 603 A.2d 30, 32 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. 1992). If the proposed use is deemed "inherently 
beneficial," the positive criteria requirement is 
automatically satisfied. Nevertheless, once the positive and 
negative criteria are established, they must still be 
balanced against one another. See id. at 164, 603 A.2d at 
36-37. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has provided local boards 
with a four step procedure for balancing positive and 
negative criteria. First, the board should identify the public 
interest at stake and determine, in the general scheme of 
public importance, whether or not it is compelling. Second, 
the board should identify the detrimental effects of granting 
the variance and determine whether they are only minimal 
or more severe. Third, the board should reduce any 
detrimental effects, if possible, by imposing reasonable 
conditions on the proposed use. Finally, the board should 
weigh the positive against the negative criteria and 
determine whether, on balance, granting the variance 
would be a substantial detriment to the public good. See id. 
at 165-66, 603 A.2d at 37. 
 
The providers raise several challenges to the Board's 
balancing of the positive and negative criteria in this case. 
First, they claim that in evaluating the positive criteria, the 
Board erroneously focused on the proposed facility's 
deviations from the relevant conditions imposed by the 
zoning ordinance. In their view, the positive criteria issue 
turns on the particular benefits of placing the facility at the 
proposed site, not on the extent to which it deviates from 
applicable zoning conditions. We disagree. 
 
In Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 138 N.J. 285, 650 A.2d 340 (1994), the New 
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Jersey Supreme Court held that the standard for 
establishing the "positive" criteria required under New 
Jersey zoning law depends on the type of variance at issue. 
Where, as here, a variance is necessary to permit a non- 
conforming conditional use, the applicant need only prove 
that the site continues to be suitable for the proposed use 
despite its failure to comply with one or more conditions. 
See id. at 298-99, 650 A.2d at 346-47. The Coventry court 
explained that: 
 
       [the conditional-use] standard of proof will focus both 
       the applicant's and the board's attention on the specific 
       deviation from conditions imposed by the ordinance, 
       and will permit the board to find special reasons to 
       support the variance only if it is persuaded that the 
       non-compliance with conditions does not affect the 
       suitability of the site for the conditional use. 
 
Id. at 298-99, 650 A.2d at 346-47. Thus, satisfying the 
positive criteria for a non-conforming conditional use 
appears to turn on its deviation from the applicable 
conditions, not on the benefits of locating it at the proposed 
site. Nevertheless, New Jersey law still required the Board 
to consider the benefits of the proposed facility at the 
balancing stage of its analysis. The record clearly shows 
that the Board did so, and that it found the benefits of 
locating the proposed facility at the proposed site to be 
outweighed by the negative consequences. 
 
The providers' remaining challenges are essentially 
derivative of the Telecommunications Act claims that we 
have already resolved. First, they claim that the Board 
erroneously dismissed expert testimony that the proposed 
monopole would have no detrimental impact on the value of 
surrounding homes, and thus gave too much weight to the 
negative criteria. We have already held that the Board's 
findings on this issue were supported by substantial 
evidence. Second, they renew their claim that the Board 
had no authority to evaluate the quality of existing wireless 
service, much less determine that it is adequate, and to 
discount the positive criteria accordingly. Again, we have 
already held that the Board was not barred from evaluating 
the quality of existing wireless service, though its discretion 
in that area is subject to limitations. Finally, the providers 
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claim that the Board's assessment of existing wireless 
service, and thus the weight given to the positive criteria, is 
erroneous because it improperly dismisses expert 
testimony, and relies instead on incompetent evidence. As 
we have already noted, we agree with the providers on this 
point. Consequently, we must reverse the district court's 
summary judgment on the communication provider's state 
law claim. If, on remand, the Board reaches the balancing 
stage, it must adjust the weight given to the positive criteria 
(i.e., the public benefit of enhancing personal wireless 
services in and around Ho-Ho-Kus) based on a proper 
evaluation of existing service, and in compliance with 
applicable state law. 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
In sum, we reverse the district court's summary 
judgment on both the Telecommunications Act and state 
law claims. We affirm its ruling that the Board was not 
barred from considering the quality of existing personal 
wireless service, and that its findings regarding the 
proposed monopole's economic impact on surrounding 
properties was supported by substantial evidence. We also 
conclude that the Board correctly identified the factors 
affecting the positive criteria necessary to approve a 
conditional-use variance under New Jersey law. 
 
We remand to the district court with instructions that it 
remand for the Board to reconsider the proposed facility in 
compliance with this opinion. In doing so, we note that the 
Telecommunications Act requires the Board to act"within 
a reasonable period of time." 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). We 
also note that the Board took two-and-a-half years to reach 
a final decision on the providers' original request to build 
the proposed facility. The extensive record developed during 
prior proceedings should significantly streamline the 
process of reconsideration, and any undue delay in 
reaching a decision could justify injunctive relief in favor of 
the providers. 
 
If, after reconsideration, the Board approves the proposed 
facility, this matter will have reached its final end. If, 
however, the Board rejects the proposed facility for a 
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second time, its decision will remain subject to 
nondeferential review under the "effect of prohibiting" 
standard. The district court will then have to determine 
whether there are any significant gaps in existing personal 
wireless services. If significant gaps exist, the court must 
then determine whether the proposed facility willfill those 
gaps. We think it worth noting, however, that the 
Telecommunications Act does not abrogate local zoning 
authority in favor of the commercial desire to offer optimal 
service to all current and potential customers. Hence, if the 
district court ultimately finds significant gaps in existing 
service, the providers still bear the burden of proving that 
the proposed facility is the least intrusive means of filling 
those gaps with a reasonable level of service. 
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